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RECENT DECISIONS
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE OF CON-
TRACTUAL RELATIONS-DAMAGES.-The plaintiff, an attorney at law,
had a contract with his client, who had been injured by an automobile
owned by one who had been insured, which provided for payment to
the attorney of 25 per cent of the amount of any settlement. The
client was induced by the defendant insurance company's agents to
breach the contract of retainer, after which the client received $25,000
by way of settlement. In this action the plaintiff seeks damages equal
to the amount received by the client. Held, that the plaintiff has a
cause of action 1 but is entitled to recover from defendants only such
amount as he would be entitled to recover from his client, namely the
reasonable value of his services.2 Lurie v. New Amsterdam Casualty
Co., 270 N. Y. 379, 1 N. E. (2d) 472 (1936).
It is well settled, that a contract of retainer may be cancelled at
any time and for any reason,3 but such an agreement cannot be par-
tially abrogated. Either it wholly stands or totally falls. After can-
cellation, its terms no longer serve to establish the sole standard for
the attorney's compensation. However, it may be taken into con-
sideration in determining the amount of recovery under quantum
reruit.4  Cancellation does not constitute a breach of contract, for
implied in every such agreement is the right to discharge.5 This is
so, because of the confidential relationship between attorney and cli-
ent, which injects into the agreement special and unique features. If
the client exercises this right he will be liable to the attorney for the
reasonable value of the services already rendered by the attorney,6
'Posner Co. v. Jackson, 223 N. Y. 325, 119 N. E. 573 (1918); Lamb v.
S. Cheney & Son, 227 N. Y. 418, 125 N. E. 817 (1920); Hornstein v. Pod-
witz, 254 N. Y. 443, 173 N. Y. 674 (1930).
2I re Tillman, 259 N. Y. 133, 181 N. E. 75 (1932); Application of
Krooks, 257 N. Y. 329, 178 N. E. 548 (1931).
'Matter of Dunn, 205 N. Y. 398, 98 N. E. 914 (1912). For a discharge
of an attorney, during the course of actual litigation, to be effective, it must
be by order of court which will fix the amount of the att6rney's lien and
may require security for attorney's fees. U. S. v. McMurty, 24 F. (2d) 145
(S. D. N. Y. 1927); Martin v. Camp, 219 N. Y. 170, 114 N. E. 46 (1916);
It re Tillman, 259 N. Y. 133, 181 N. E. 75 (1932).
"In re Tillman, 259 N. Y. 133, 181 N. E. 75 (1932).
'Martin v. Camp, 219 N. Y. 170, 114 N. E. 46 (1916); Johnson v.
Baritch, 113 App. Div. 810, 99 N. Y. Supp. 1059 (2d Dept. 1906).
6This view represents the minority view with which New York is in
accord, and it is criticized in 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1029 and
in (1917) 2 CoRN. L. Q. 109; (1921) 30 YAIE L. J. 514, supports it. In the
majority of jurisdictions, a discharge without cause is held to be a breach of
the retainer contract giving the attorney an action for damages. Brodie v.
Watkins, 33 Ark. 545 (1878); Webb v. Rrescony, 76 Cal. 621, 18 Pac. 796
(1878). See note (1936) 21 CORN. L. Q. 455 for discussion -of this subject.
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and if the attorney has fully performed prior to the discharge, he may
stand upon his contract so as to measure his damages. An action for
breach of contract only arises from a contract of employment for a
definite period.7
A client has the right to settle in good faith 8 the litigation at any
stage 1 without the knowledge or consent '0 of the attorney. The
clause in the contract of retainer which prohibits the client from
settling the litigation without the consent of the attorney is void as
being against public policy."
In the instant case, the fact that the attorney has a cause of ac-
tion against his client does not exonerate the parties who wrongfully
induced the breach.' 2 The attorney has chosen to bring action against
them and the jury having found that they induced the client to re-
pudiate the agreement, they are liable to the attorney for such amount
as the attorney would have been entitled to receive from the client
down to the date of cancellation. It is true that the attorney was
mistaken as to the rule of damages in the case at bar; however, he is
not precluded from recovering, because there is no requirement of law
that the measure of damages alleged to have been sustained shall be
stated in the complaint. 13 It is sufficient if the complaint states facts
from which damages can properly be inferred, without specifically
enumerating the items of damages or the rules of law controlling the
measure of damages. 14
V. E. C.
BILLS AND NOTES-NOTE GIVEN AS FICTITIOUS BANK ASSET-
DEFENSE OF LACK OF CONSIDERATION.-Action on a promissory
note of which the defendant is the maker. The note was drawn by
the defendant to his own order and indorsed over to the plaintiff
bank so as to deceive the bank examiner by enhancing the bank's
assets. The bank president, fearing a "run" on the bank, entreated
and procured the defendant to execute the note, promising not to
hold him liable on it. In an action by the bank to recover the value
'Greenberg v. Resnick & Co., 230 N. Y. 70, 129 N. E. 211 (1920).
'Matter of Levy, 249 N. Y. 168, 163 N. E. 244 (1928); Fisher-Hausen
v. Brooklyn Heights R. R., 173 N. Y. 492, 66 N. E. 395 (1903).
'Matter of Levy, 249 N. Y. 168, 163 N. E. 244 (1928).
"In re Snyder, 190 N. Y. 66, 82 N. E. 742 (1907); Lee v. Vacuum Oil
Co., 126 N. Y. 579, 27 N. E. 1018 (1891) ; Bailey v. Murphy, 136 N. Y. 50,
32 N. E. 627 (1892).
4'In re Snyder, 190 N. Y. 66, 82 N. E. 742 (1907); (1929) 6 N. Y. U.
L. Q. REV. 201.
Hornstein v. Podivitz, 254 N. Y. 443, 173 N. E. 674 (1930).
"Colrick v. Swinburne, 105 N. Y. 503, 12 N. E. 427 (1887); Winter v.
American Airline Products Inc., 236 N. Y. 199, 140 N. E. 561 (1923).
" Winter v. American Airline Products Inc., 236 N. Y. 199, 140 N. E. 561(1923).
[ VOL. 11
